In recent months, the Somali government has been loudly promoting the idea of returning to universal suffrage by 2026 — the first such election in more than half a century. On the surface, this is a noble and overdue goal, one that has been on Somalia’s political wish list for decades and which I personally support in principle.
But then, there is the reality of the Somali situation: this is not a remotely achievable goal in 2026, and the government knows it. The announcement is less about genuine democratic reform and more of the same drama we see every time an incumbent’s term is nearing its end: setting impossible goals to justify indefinite extensions of power.
If only the current administration can get just a little bit more time, the reasoning goes, then we swear, it will finally be done. Nevermind that this very same president made this very same promise in 2012, 13 years ago.
This essay explains why the promise is hollow. After outlining the legal and institutional deficiencies, I will address political fragmentation, demographic uncertainty, security realities, the government’s troubling move toward a single-party state, and the inexplicable recognition of SSC-Khaatumo/North Eastern State as a new federal unit.
The Legal Framework Problem
Let’s start with the most obvious problem: Somalia has no actual constitution. A provisional constitution – riddled with contradictions – has been in place since 2012 when the current order was set up. It was meant to last for 1–2 years, until permanent authorities were set up (in Sep 2012) whose first & only priority was to be the introduction of a new permanent constitution.
Today, 13 years and 3 administrations later, there is no real talk of changing that provisional document. Why the document hasn’t been reviewed and finalised is anybody’s guess. I put my money on utter incompetence. What else would explain 3 consecutive legislatures being so devoid of national responsibility that we still do not have any agreement on the most fundamental rules of the game.
One could mention the two recently changed clauses but that would just be reiterating a cruel joke being played on the Somali people. After all, fundamental clauses were changed in a jiffy. The new clauses were introduced, debated, and adopted within 72 hours. It simply cannot be considered a serious effort, since it was passed purely due to the government’s largesse.
Without a settled constitutional order, basic electoral questions remain unanswered:
- Who can run for office, and under what conditions? - What are the rules for registering candidates, and why does it cost up to $10,000 in a country where the average monthly income is about $100? - How will electoral disputes be resolved, given there is no constitutional court and no defined recount procedures?
This legal vacuum leaves the Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) — which is neither independent nor impartial — free to act as an arm of the executive. The NIEC lacks financial autonomy, operating on whatever budget the government chooses to grant, and thus being forced to cater to its whims . In such conditions, it cannot credibly set election timelines, design a voting system suitable for an illiterate population, or educate citizens about the process.
Administrative & Institutional Weakness
Even if the legal framework were in place, Somalia’s electoral machinery is incapable of running a credible nationwide poll. The NIEC is structurally partisan, dominated by political appointees whose decisions consistently favor the ruling group. It has yet to pass a decision which is objectively sound and not universally disputed.
Deciding on the voting method — paper, electronic, or hybrid — is unresolved. Constituency boundaries are undefined. And there is no clarity on how to accommodate rural or nomadic voters, let alone displaced populations in camps, both those within the country, and in neighbouring states.
Political Fragmentation
The Somali “federal” map is severely fractured. Let’s take a look.
Somaliland, to which a significant number of seats are assigned, is for all intents and purposes, fully separate from the federal system, and beyond the writ of that state & its agencies. It is foolish to consider any representation for the Somaliland people in Mogadishu institutions when they have directly elected representatives in their Republic.
The federal government recently repackaged the long-running project Khaatumo, and created a new “North Eastern State” (NES) from territory belonging to Somaliland and Puntland — without consultation, not even with Puntland, sparking outrage.
Puntland rejects the proposed one-person-one-vote (1P1V) elections (after its own largely failed experiment) and disputes the federal writ in general. It goes without saying that it also strongly opposes all efforts related to the NES.
Jubbaland has refused voter registration. Separately (or perhaps directly related to the elections), the federal government is also trying to wrest control of Gedo region from the local state authorities.
Hirshabelle is divided by internal conflict of all sorts: within the regional authorities, between regional and federal authorities, independent clan militias, and an Al-Shabaab on the up and up.
Galmudug and South West State are said to be vassals of the federal government (with the compliant parts of Hirshabelle) as they all have leaders whose “constitutional” term has expired and are considered illegitimate in some circles within their own states.
The cherry on top is that there is talk now, perhaps by more pessimistic segments of society and the world, that Al-Shabaab is expected to overrun many government positions, and even pose a direct challenge to the federal government in Mogadishu.
Demographics & Constituency Challenges
Then we come to the most important component: the voters. Nobody knows how many people live in the country, the age distribution, or where in the country they live. There are some independent agencies which have produced extrapolated “guesstimates”, basically back of the napkin calculations. Nothing on which to base such consequential decisions.
In fact, there have been no coherent or concerted efforts to count the population since around the colonial times & upon the union of Somaliland and Somalia. Domestic attempts at population counts, like the much-derided 2019 exercise, produced implausible figures. Numbers have been provided by the UN and other international agencies but these are at best educated guesses extrapolated from parameters that might not hold true in Somalia, given the general conditions, and the lack of reliable data.
There is an ongoing (highly disputed) effort to register voters for the 2026 elections but voter registration drives cannot produce reliable results in the absence of security and jurisdictional clarity. Nomadic and rural communities, very large segments of Somali society, are especially hard to reach, and there is no plan for where and how they will cast ballots. Worse, large areas remain under Al-Shabaab control, where federal agencies cannot even set foot.
Security Realities
Security is not just bad — it is structurally broken. Somalia’s military is fractured into competing “elite” units loyal to different command structures, within the country but sometimes directly to foreign donors as well. Federal forces function less like a national army and more like a political enforcement tool.
Federal troops have fought Jubbaland forces, and within Puntland, rival armed groups — some federal, some local — compete for dominance. In this environment, securing polling stations nationwide will be impossible. In Al-Shabaab areas, voting will be entirely absent; in contested regions, elections could trigger outright conflict. Except for Somaliland’s recent experiences, free general elections have never really been held in the entire Somali horn.
The True Cost
Holding a nationwide election would require huge sums for logistics, security, and administration. Candidate fees — currently justified as a cost-recovery measure — cannot begin to cover these expenses. Federal budget allocations are insufficient for a small, limited poll, let alone a nationwide election with universal suffrage. This shortfall means Somalia will depend almost entirely on donors, the so-called International Community, who already finance about 70% of the federal budget.
Donors & Their Conflicting Interests
The international community, as often referred to in Somalia, is not a monolithic entity with shared goals. It is a loose collection of states, each pursuing its own strategic interests. While they may all be invested in maintaining the appearance of competent Somali authorities, their priorities diverge — sometimes sharply.
Given their control over the national purse strings, and the inexplicable ceding of sovereignty by our political class collectively, donor states will inevitably shape the election agenda, timelines, and conditions. This influence could produce an election that serves external optics rather than internal legitimacy, as has unfortunately been the case since the collapse of the dictatorship in 1991.
The New Single-Party Agenda
The first paragraph of the first article of the first chapter of the (provisional) Somali Constitution states:
“Somalia is a federal, sovereign, and democratic republic founded on inclusive representation of the people and a multiparty system and social justice.”
Sometimes, it feels like the absurdity of Somali politicians seems to know no bounds. Today, our leaders are well on their way to re-implementing a single party state. In the very tiny section of our shared history where we had been a republic (1960 - 1991), we had only had single party setups and that led to nothing positive for the Somali people.
Quick historical recap: Although the Somali Republic was nominally a multi-party state until the 1969 coup, the country only had clan-based parties that fought for regional seats and then merged with the Somali Youth League (SYL) that ruled the country until the “socialist” military coup. The military justified its intervention by citing the elections that had been held months previously, and that were universally deemed to be rigged, thanks to the ruling SYL and its crony politics. The junta eventually created its own political party to channel its power and banned all other political associations. The resentment this repression bred led to the civil war that made our nation the unenviable global poster child for a failed state.
To propose, in a country that is still recovering from a civil war caused by single party rule, that the people should again hand over all political power to a single state party apparatus warrants questioning your basic intelligence and your grasp on reality.
Given the proposing side in actuality controls little more than a city-state, Mogadishu, and within which there are multiple armed groups, let alone the rest of the country, how could they actually proceed with the creation of this party against a backdrop of universal rejection?
It’s merely rhetorical, they have already created this party. And the fact that the government has already created this party despite widespread rejection suggests the electoral process is intended to entrench, not challenge, its power.
In Conclusion
The Somali government’s 2026 universal suffrage promise is not a roadmap — it is a mirage. The legal framework is non-existent, the institutions are partisan by design, the political map is splintered into hundreds of pieces, the population is unmapped and unaccounted for, the security forces are fractured and little more than an enforcement wing for political decisions, and the money for most activities is simply not there.
As usual, this election plan exists merely to buy time for the incumbents under the guise of “democratic transition.” Somalia deserves real electoral reform and the people deserve the opportunity to choose their leaders but it has to start with a constitution, a functioning security apparatus, and credible agreements among federal member states.
Until those basic conditions exist, promising nationwide one-person-one-vote elections in 2026 is not just unrealistic — it is a familiar and calculated lie.