The Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland has sparked considerable controversy across the Horn of Africa. At its core, the agreement involves Ethiopia gaining access to the Red Sea through Somaliland ports in exchange for recognition—either formal diplomatic recognition or de facto economic and security partnerships.
This arrangement, while presented as bilateral cooperation, carries implications far beyond the two signatories. It touches on unresolved sovereignty questions, regional power dynamics, and the legacy of colonial borders that still shape African politics.
The Context of Red Sea Access
Ethiopia's quest for sea access isn't new. The country became landlocked in 1993 when Eritrea gained independence, severing Ethiopia's connection to its former ports of Massawa and Assab. Since then, Ethiopia has relied primarily on Djibouti for maritime trade—over 95% of its imports and exports transit through Djibouti's port.
This dependence creates vulnerability. A single point of failure, political tensions with Djibouti, or disruptions at that port could cripple Ethiopia's economy. For a country of 120 million people with regional ambitions, this isn't acceptable. Ethiopia has been pursuing port diversification for years, including agreements with Kenya and Somalia.
Somaliland offers an attractive alternative. Its ports—particularly Berbera—are less congested than Djibouti, geographically well-positioned, and represent a shorter route to Ethiopia's northern regions. Moreover, Somaliland's de facto independence (though internationally unrecognized) means it can negotiate without Mogadishu's approval.
Somaliland's Calculation
From Somaliland's perspective, the MoU represents a breakthrough after three decades of seeking recognition. Since declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland has established functional governance, held democratic elections, maintained relative stability, and built institutions—yet remains internationally unrecognized.
This lack of recognition limits access to international financing, multilateral institutions, and development assistance. It constrains diplomatic options and leaves Somaliland in legal limbo. The territory functions like a state but lacks statehood's international benefits.
An agreement with Ethiopia—particularly one involving implied or explicit recognition—could change this calculation. If Ethiopia, a major regional power and African Union member, recognizes Somaliland, it could trigger a cascade. Other countries might follow, especially those with separatist concerns of their own or those seeking to counter Somali influence in the region.
Somalia's Opposition
The Federal Government of Somalia views the MoU as a violation of its sovereignty. From Mogadishu's perspective, Somaliland is not an independent nation but a breakaway region that remains legally part of Somalia. Any agreement Somaliland signs cannot be internationally valid without Somalia's consent.
Somalia has responded diplomatically and symbolically—recalling ambassadors, appealing to international bodies, and framing the MoU as Ethiopian aggression. This response is constrained by Somalia's limited leverage. The country remains fragile, dependent on international support, and lacking the capacity to enforce its claims militarily or economically.
Regional Implications
The MoU's impact extends beyond the immediate parties. Djibouti views Ethiopian diversification as a threat to its port monopoly and resulting revenue. Eritrea, already tense with Ethiopia, sees another potential point of friction. Egypt, embroiled in Nile water disputes with Ethiopia, has signaled support for Somalia, viewing an opportunity to constrain Ethiopian power.
The Arab League has entered the debate, generally supporting Somalia's position. This reflects broader tensions between Arab states and the Horn of Africa's non-Arab powers, particularly Ethiopia. It also highlights how regional organizations often prioritize territorial integrity over practical governance realities.
The Recognition Question
At the heart of the controversy lies a fundamental question: under what conditions should breakaway regions gain recognition? International law generally favors territorial integrity, but practice is more complex. South Sudan, Eritrea, and Kosovo all gained recognition despite initial opposition.
The African Union's traditional stance—inherited from the OAU—has been that colonial borders are inviolable, however arbitrary. This principle aimed to prevent the continent from fragmenting along ethnic or clan lines. Yet it also means maintaining states that may not function or may not reflect popular will.
The lesson: fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. Africa has been fooled before. It would be a tragedy to watch it happen again.
Whatever emerges from this controversy will shape Horn of Africa politics for years. It will influence how other unrecognized regions pursue statehood, how regional powers assert influence, and how international norms around sovereignty evolve.